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Casual observation suggests that capital allocation is often driven by favoritism and connections
rather than by market mechanisms and information on future expected returns. We investigate
when favoritism or markets emerge as an equilibrium outcome in the allocation of capital. We
show that when information is unreliable and costly, ﬁnanciers do not have incentives to investi-
gate distant investment opportunities and allocate capital to entrepreneurs they are familiar with
(favoritism). If the pool of saving is relatively small, favoritism can lead to an eﬃcient allocation
of investment. As the economy develops and its pool of saving increases, information production
and the identiﬁcation of distant investment opportunities (markets) become crucial for eﬃcient
investment decisions. Nevertheless, favoritism may still emerge in equilibrium and investors may
ﬁnd it optimal to fund low-quality entrepreneurs if they are familiar with them. Since competition
for capital is lower in an equilibrium with favoritism, entrepreneurs can enjoy high rents. Even
high quality entrepreneurs may thus have no incentive to join markets with high listing standards
that can foster information acquisition, but they rather prefer to run ineﬃciently small ﬁrms.
Keywords: Crony capitalism; Information productionI Introduction
One of the main functions of a ﬁnancial system is to facilitate capital ﬂows from individual savers
to the highest return investments (Levine, 2006). It is quite common that the highest return
investments are new technologies or opportunities that investors are unfamiliar with. To fund
such investment opportunities, ﬁnanciers need to acquire information. However, ﬁnancial systems
often fail to foster information acquisition and to promote ﬂows of capital to high productivity
investments and new technologies. The empirical evidence shows that ﬁnancial intermediaries often
convey funds to their cronies (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Zamarripa, 2003); that entrepreneurs
reinvest funds in their own businesses or in the ones of family members (Almeida and Wolfenzon,
2006); and that a large number of ﬁrms around the world choose not to be listed in a stock market
and raise capital only from a narrow circle of family and friends (Pagano, Panetta and Zingales,
1998).
Capital allocation thus seems to be driven by favoritism and connections more than by market
mechanisms and information on future expected returns. Favoritism in capital allocation may arise
if investors are reluctant to acquire information because the available information is imprecise,
unreliable or costly. High information acquisition costs as well as lack of disclosure can make
the return to information acquisition so unattractive that ﬁnanciers save the cost and pass on
potentially good investment opportunities; instead, they choose to fund entrepreneurs whom they
are already familiar with because of geographical proximity or personal connections. This tendency
is accentuated if ﬁnanciers enjoy non-pecuniary beneﬁts — which may be associated with weak
corporate governance or corruption — when funding close entrepreneurs.
In this paper, we explore the conditions under which ﬁnanciers ﬁnd it optimal to identify distant
investment opportunities instead of favoring close entrepreneurs. We also analyze the implications
of information acquisition (or the lack thereof) for capital allocation, investment returns and entre-
preneurial rents. We show that when the pool of saving is relatively small, an eﬃcient allocation
of resources can be achieved even if ﬁnanciers do not investigate new investment opportunities and
fund only entrepreneurs they are familiar with. This is because the general technology, which is
not subject to information asymmetry, oﬀers a relatively high rate of return to ﬁnanciers when
the pool of saving is small. To receive funding, a close entrepreneur has to compete with the
general technology by oﬀering an even higher return, a return that low-productivity entrepreneurs
1typically cannot aﬀord. Hence, even in the absence of information acquisition, capital is allocated
eﬃciently to the most productive investment opportunities. The only constraint to the growth of
high-productivity entrepreneurs is the low level of saving in the economy.
As the economy develops and its pool of saving increases, information production and the
identiﬁcation of distant investment opportunities become crucial for achieving an eﬃcient allocation
of capital. A high level of initial saving drives down the return to the general technology. In the
absence of information acquisition, ﬁnanciers lack alternative investment opportunities and fund
close entrepreneurs even if they have low productivity. High-productivity entrepreneurs’ investment
instead is lower than optimal as they receive funding only from close ﬁnanciers; had they also
employed distant ﬁnanciers’ capital, their and the whole economy’s aggregate output would have
been higher.
In addition to capital allocation, information production also dramatically aﬀects entrepreneur-
ial rents and the equilibrium return to ﬁnanciers’ investment. Financiers have limited investment
opportunities if they do not acquire information, and thus end up funding even low-productivity
entrepreneurs. Further, information acquisition has two opposite eﬀects on the payoﬀso fh i g h -
productivity entrepreneurs. On the one hand, lack of information acquisition reduces competition to
attract capital, allowing high-productivity entrepreneurs to oﬀer low returns to ﬁnanciers and thus
to enjoy higher rents per unit of capital invested. This implies that in equilibrium high-productivity
entrepreneurs may not have incentives to induce information acquisition by establishing higher dis-
closure standards. On the other hand, if ﬁnanciers do not acquire information, high-productivity
entrepreneurs can be funded only by close ﬁnanciers and thus run ineﬃciently small ﬁrms. This
should induce them to voluntarily improve disclosure.
We show that high-productivity entrepreneurs favor higher disclosure and stricter — though
lower than optimal — listing standards only if they can attract a suﬃciently large pool of capital.
That high-productivity entrepreneurs may favor an improvement in disclosure and/or in listing
standards when the supply of capital increases, for example, triggered by a ﬁnancial liberalization,
is consistent with the empirical evidence. Stulz (1999) notices that often, ﬁnancial liberalization
not only brings more funds to capital-poor countries, but also improves corporate governance, as
more sophisticated foreign ﬁnanciers start monitoring and domestic companies become targets of
potential foreign takeovers. In this paper, we highlight another reason why ﬁnancial liberalization
2may spur an improvement in corporate governance: The gain from attracting distant ﬁnanciers
increases and entrepreneurs are willing to renounce to some rents in order to be able to invest
more.
Mandatory disclosure and improved listing standards are crucial in economies with intermediate
level of saving and with a closed capital market. In this case, the initial saving is high enough to
drive down the return of the general technology so that even low productivity entrepreneurs are
funded. However, ﬁnanciers’ information acquisition does not bring suﬃciently larger investment to
high productivity entrepreneurs to compensate for lower rents. Hence, high quality entrepreneurs
would not have an incentive to voluntarily join an exchange that requires higher listing standards.
This paper contributes to the literature analyzing how diﬀerent ﬁnancial systems and institu-
tions may aﬀect economic performance at diﬀerent stages of development (Allen and Gale, 2000).
We show that institutions fostering information acquisition are unimportant for an eﬃcient alloca-
tion of saving at early stage of development (low domestic saving). Listing standards and disclosure
becomes crucial at intermediate stages of development as even high quality entrepreneurs may not
have incentives to improve disclosure and listing standards. When an economy reaches high level
of development (high domestic saving) or liberalizes capital ﬂows, entrepreneurs may voluntarily
improve disclosure and listing standards, even though to a level that does not completely eliminate
ineﬃciency in capital allocation.
Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2001) also study the relation between capital market develop-
ment and investment. They show that families may have an incentive to sell their companies to
outsiders only after companies have reached a certain size. Instead, we show that an economy’s
initial saving — not entrepreneurial ﬁrms’ size — has an eﬀect on the eﬃciency of capital allocation
and on whether markets emerge.
In our model, information acquisition allows ﬁnanciers to engage in winner-picking, similarly
to headquarters in internal capital markets (Stein, 1997). Contrary to Stein however, we do not
assume that some ﬁnanciers (the headquarter in his model) have better information; instead, we
endogenously model the incentives to produce information and analyze the (general) equilibrium
implications of the “winner-picking” eﬀect. The ineﬃciency of the equilibrium in which ﬁnanciers
allocate funds based on closeness and personal ties, rather than acquiring information on distant in-
vestment opportunities, is similar to the one highlighted by Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006). Almeida
3and Wolfenzon show that, because of the limited pledgeability of externally funded projects’ output,
conglomerates may choose to fund mediocre projects internally when other ﬁrms in the economy
have higher productivity projects that are in need of external capital. We abstract from prob-
lems of enforcement aﬀecting the pledgeability of output and show that ineﬃciencies in investment
allocation may arise also if ﬁnanciers do not have an incentive to investigate new investment oppor-
tunities. Additionally, we explore the conditions under which ﬁnanciers have incentives to produce
information, the consequences on ﬁnanciers’ equilibrium return to investment, and entrepreneurial
rents.
Our paper is also related to a vast literature on disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001). This
literature generally analyzes the disclosure decisions of a ﬁrm in isolation. We analyze incentives
to make information more readily available to ﬁnanciers (thus reducing the information acquisition
cost) in a (general) equilibrium model. We show that disclosure aﬀects competition for external
funds, and consequently ﬁnancier’s equilibrium returns. Like Fishman and Hagerty (1989), we
propose that greater disclosure may improve investment eﬃciency. This arises however for very
diﬀerent reasons. Fishman and Hagerty, like most of the papers in the disclosure literature, analyze
a secondary equity market. Disclosure improves eﬃciency only to the extent that gives stronger in-
centives to management. We analyze a primary equity market. In this context, disclosure improves
eﬃciency because it allows a more eﬃcient allocation of investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the model. Section III derives
the equilibrium implications. Section IV provides empirical evidence in support of the implications
of the model. Section V concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
II The Model
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the essentials of the model. We then present the timing and ﬁnally
deﬁne the equilibrium. The model presented here is the most tractable framework in which we
can obtain our results. Technical assumptions are relegated to Section III in which we derive the
equilibrium.
We consider an economy with two types of risk neutral agents: a number N of penniless
entrepreneurs and a continuum I of ﬁnanciers.
4AF i n a n c i e r s
Each ﬁnancier is endowed with initial capital k>0. Hence, the total capital available in the econ-
omy is kI. Financiers can fund the entrepreneurs or the general technology up to their endowment.
An entrepreneur can be either “close” or “distant” to a ﬁnancier. An entrepreneur is close
to a ﬁnancier because of geographical proximity or personal connections. In this paper, we model
“closeness” from the perspective of the ex ante information acquisition and normalize other costs
(such as monitoring costs) to zero. In particular, we assume that ﬁnanciers are aware of close
entrepreneurs and can evaluate their type at no cost.
To be able to fund a distant entrepreneur, ﬁnanciers have to acquire information at cost τ.O n e
can interpret τ as the cost of becoming aware of new investment opportunities and evaluating a
distant entrepreneur’s business. In this way, we intend to capture that expanding the investment
horizon beyond one’s own neighborhood and close investment opportunities entails a cost. It will
be clear later that spending τ also involves beneﬁts whose magnitude depends on entrepreneurs’
competition for capital.
Alternatively, all ﬁnanciers can invest in the general technology that provides return per unit
of capital invested — g (ω) —a tn oc o s t .
Deﬁnition 1 (Favoritism versus Markets) We refer to situations in which ﬁnanciers do not acquire
information on any distant entrepreneur and, without knowing any alternative, invest in the close
entrepreneur or the general technology as favoritism. We refer to situations in which ﬁnanciers
acquire information about some distant entrepreneurs as markets.
Under favoritism, local markets for capital remain completely segmented. This segmentation in
the local market for capital is partially overcome by markets,w h e r eﬁnanciers acquire information
about some distant entrepreneurs and where capital allocation is driven by information on distant
and close entrepreneurs’ relative returns. For simplicity, we assume that when ﬁnanciers evaluate
two entrepreneurs, all ﬁnanciers close to entrepreneur i evaluate the same entrepreneur j (and
vice versa) if they choose to acquire information on a distant entrepreneur. That is, we posit that
ﬁnanciers belonging to a given clientele evaluate the same entrepreneurs. This technical assumption
is not crucial to our results and simply ensures that ﬁnanciers are equal ex ante and ex post.I ti s ,
however, consistent with empirical evidence suggesting that diﬀerent companies cater to clienteles
5of ﬁnanciers who select companies with similar characteristics in terms of size, stock liquidity or
dividend yields (Falkenstein, 1996).
In addition, we assume that entrepreneurs can oﬀer diﬀerent returns to ﬁnanciers with diﬀerent
evaluation strategies: Financiers who acquire information can be oﬀered a return diﬀerent from that
of the ﬁnanciers who do not and who, consequently, can invest only in the close entrepreneur and the
general technology. The fact that ﬁnanciers are oﬀered diﬀerential treatment ﬁnds support in the
empirical evidence on the IPO process. Institutional ﬁnanciers that are part of an investment bank’s
network are expected to participate repeatedly and indiscriminately to an investment bank’s deals
and to contribute to produce information. In exchange for this commitment, ﬁnanciers that are part
of the network are allocated stocks in the pre-IPO market at a better price than retail ﬁnanciers and
other institutional ﬁnanciers that are not part of the network (who can buy stocks only at the ﬁrst
day trading price).1 Financiers can also buy stocks at diﬀerent prices in the grey market for IPOs
(a when-issued market for IPO shares active before the subscription period, especially in European
countries).2 Finally, ﬁnanciers are oﬀered similar securities at diﬀerent prices depending on their
information when companies (or more often banks) raise funds through securitization (Firla-Cuchra
and Jenkinson, 2006).
B Entrepreneurs and Technologies
Each entrepreneur is endowed with a project. We think of projects as new ideas with diﬀerent
return to investment. For simplicity, we assume that entrepreneurial projects have a constant
return to scale technology with productivity AH or AL,w h e r eAH 1 AL. The productivity level
deﬁnes the entrepreneur’s type. The prior probabilities of AH and AL are αH and αL ≡ 1 − αH,
respectively.
Entrepreneurs have no capital endowment. They compete to attract capital from ﬁnanciers.
The more capital an entrepreneur attracts, the larger the investment and thus the size of the ﬁrm
he runs.
We assume that in order to attract capital from ﬁnanciers, entrepreneurs bid sequentially by
oﬀering a return per unit of capital invested. The bargaining game is as follows: an entrepreneur
1The discretionary allocation of IPOs to institutional investors is believed to promote information production
(Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002)
2See Cornelli, Goldreich and Ljungqvist (2006).
6is randomly selected to make a ﬁrst oﬀer which is observed by the other entrepreneurs and all
ﬁnanciers that are aware of the entrepreneur. In order to attract capital, other entrepreneurs can
counter-oﬀer. Entrepreneurs continue to counter-oﬀer for a given ﬁnancier until when she accepts
an oﬀer. Financiers accept the highest credible oﬀer on the basis of their information on the type
of the entrepreneur. In equilibrium, entrepreneurs oﬀe rar e t u r nt h a ti sa tm o s te q u a lt ot h er e t u r n
of the alternative investment opportunities available to the ﬁnancier. Thus, the outcome of the
multi-period bargaining is the same of Bertrand competition with symmetric information.
Note that oﬀering a return to ﬁnanciers is equivalent to say that entrepreneurs oﬀer ﬁnanciers
equity in the project at a price that guarantees a given return. Therefore, if an H entrepreneur
oﬀers return AL, ﬁnanciers will receive a fraction AL
AH of the output produced per unit of capital
invested. Similarly, an L entrepreneur oﬀering return AL promises 100 per cent of the output
produced per unit of capital invested.
Similarly to Almeida and Wolfenzon (2005 and 2006), we assume that capital can also be
invested in a general technology. The general technology captures any well-known activities that
do not require new entrepreneurial skills (e.g., agriculture and any traditional sector in which
innovation is not important). We assume that the general technology can be operated by any
agent and provides a return per unit of capital invested g (ω),w h e r eω is the total capital invested
in the general technology. The return to the general technology is decreasing in the total capital
invested (for instance, because the price of crops drops if too much is produced) and
∂(ωg(ω))
∂ω > 0.
The latter assumption ensures that the total output from the general technology increases in the
invested capital. For simplicity, we also assume g (0) >A H, which ensures a positive investment in
the general technology in equilibrium, and lim
ω→∞g(ω) <A L, which implies that even L entrepreneurs
can be more productive than the general technology for a suﬃciently large level of ω.
C Timing and Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
The timing of the events is as follows: At time 0, ﬁnanciers choose whether to acquire information on
a distant entrepreneur. For tractability, we make the following assumptions: (1) each entrepreneur
has the same mass of close ﬁnanciers; (2) each ﬁnancier has only one close entrepreneur; (3)
ﬁnanciers can evaluate at most one distant entrepreneur; and (4) ﬁnanciers choose whether to
acquire information before observing the close entrepreneur’s productivity. These are technical
7assumptions that signiﬁcantly simplify the derivations without aﬀecting the qualitative implications
of our results. In particular, the mechanisms we il l u s t r a t eg e n e r a l i z er e a d i l yt ot h ec a s ei nw h i c h
ﬁnanciers acquire information about a ﬁnite number of distant entrepreneurs.
After observing the productivity of the close entrepreneur and of any distant entrepreneur they
have evaluated, ﬁnanciers decide how to allocate their capital between entrepreneur(s) and the
general technology. At time 1, the returns are realized and payoﬀs are distributed.
Deﬁnition 2 An equilibrium consists of ﬁnanciers’ beliefs, information acquisition decisions, cap-
ital allocations between the general technology and entrepreneurs, and returns oﬀered by entrepre-
neurs, such that:
• Financiers decide whether to acquire information in order to maximize the expected return on
their capital endowment net of the information acquisition cost;
• Taking as given the return oﬀered by the general technology and the other entrepreneur when
the ﬁnancier evaluates a distant entrepreneur, entrepreneurs oﬀer ﬁnanciers a return that
maximizes their payoﬀs;
• Financiers allocate their initial capital in order to maximizes the expected return on their
capital endowment taking as given the return oﬀered by the entrepreneur(s) and the general
technology;
• All agents’ beliefs are realized in equilibrium;
• At given returns, all ﬁnanciers that wish to fund a given entrepreneur or the general technology
do so.
III Information Acquisition and Competition for Capital
A Benchmark Case: Perfect Markets
We ﬁrst describe a benchmark case in which evaluating a distant entrepreneur involves no cost
(τ =0 ). In this case, information is symmetric as any ﬁnancier can identify all H entrepreneurs,
regardless whether they are close or distant, at no cost.
8In equilibrium, L entrepreneurs are not funded. When the economy’s capital supply (kI) is
lower than g−1 ¡
AH¢
, no entrepreneurs are funded. This is because the capital supply is so low
that even if the entire capital endowment is invested in the general technology, the return of the
general technology is higher than AH — the highest possible return an entrepreneur can oﬀer.
When the capital supply exceeds the threshold level g−1 ¡
AH¢
, the return of the general tech-
nology falls to AH,a n dH entrepreneurs receive funding from close and distant ﬁnanciers. Since
entrepreneurs compete to attract capital, they end up oﬀering return AH per unit of capital in-
vested. Then, ω0 such that g (ω0)=AH is invested in the general technology, whereas the rest of
the capital, kI − ω0, is invested in H entrepreneurs. On average, an H entrepreneur invest kI−ω0
αHN .
This implies that markets — interpreted as some investors acquire information and fund distant
entrepreneurs — emerge only if the capital supply of the economy is larger than g−1 ¡
AH¢
.F o r
any level of initial saving below this threshold, ﬁnanciers invest directly in the general technol-
ogy. Hence, favoritism can be an equilibrium outcome even without capital market imperfections.
The capital allocation is also eﬃcient as ﬁnanciers optimally choose to directly invest only in the
general technology. Markets are thus unnecessary because entrepreneurs do not receive funding in
equilibrium.
As soon as capital exceeds the threshold g−1 ¡
AH¢
, the productivity of the general technology
falls below AH and ﬁnanciers start funding H entrepreneurs. The possibility of identifying distant
entrepreneurs aﬀect the equilibrium in two important ways. First, because τ =0 ,a l lﬁnanciers are
able to identify all H entrepreneurs. This prevents the productivity of the general technology to
drop below AH. Second, entrepreneurs have to compete for capital with other H entrepreneurs. In
equilibrium, ﬁnanciers receive return AH.
Deﬁnition 3 A capital allocation is eﬃcient if the average productivity of capital is at least AH.3
The above deﬁnition of “eﬃcient” capital allocation implies that (1) less productive entrepre-
neurs — L types — do not receive funding, and (2) investment in the general technology is not larger
than g−1 ¡
AH¢
. This is because any amount of capital can be employed at AH with a constant
return to scale entrepreneurial technology. Therefore, if the capital allocation is eﬃcient, for any
initial level of capital greater than g−1 ¡
AH¢
,e a c hH entrepreneur on average should invest kI−ω0
αHN .
3Note that in our model both the general and entrepreneurial technologies are linear. Therefore, average and
marginal returns on capital are equal. Therefore, we use “average” and “marginal” returns interchangeably.
9The distance between the eﬃcient capital allocation and the actual capital allocated on average
to an H entrepreneur captures the extent of the deviation from the eﬃcient capital allocation. As
will be clear later, the capital allocated to H entrepreneurs may be lower than optimal in equilibrium
because ﬁnanciers allocate too much capital to the general technology and fund L entrepreneurs.
When distant entrepreneurs can be evaluated without cost, markets are eﬃcient as there is no
excessive capital allocation in the general technology. In the next section, we discuss how markets
emerge in equilibrium if τ>0, but remain ineﬃcient.
B On the Emergence of Markets
In what follows, we explore the equilibrium implications of costly information acquisition (τ>0).
We start by examining the equilibrium under favoritism. We then consider under what conditions
ﬁnanciers may want to acquire information about a distant entrepreneur. The latter exercise
characterizes imperfect markets (i.e., equilibria in which some ﬁnanciers fund distant entrepreneurs,
but local capital markets are still partially segmented because of the information acquisition cost).
B.1 Favoritism
Here we characterize the equilibrium in which ﬁnanciers do not acquire information about distant
entrepreneurs and can invest only in the close entrepreneur or the general technology.4 In other
words, we describe an economy in which capital is allocated through favoritism.
The following proposition states the conditions under which diﬀerent types of entrepreneurs are
funded.
Proposition 1 Suppose that ﬁnanciers do not invest in information acquisition.
• Then, in equilibrium,
1. if kI < g−1 ¡
AH¢
, no entrepreneur is ever funded and ﬁnanciers return to capital is
g(kI);
2. if g−1 ¡
AH¢
≤ kI <
g−1(AL)
αL ,o n l yt y p eH entrepreneurs are funded;
3. if kI 1
g−1(AL)
αL , both types of entrepreneurs are funded.
4This also describes the equilibrium of the model if τ →∞ .
10• Additionally, ﬁnanciers’ equilibrium return decreases in kI for kI 6
g−1(AL)
αL and is AL for
kI >
g−1(AL)
αL .
Since there is no competition for capital, entrepreneurs oﬀer at most the return of the general
technology.5 If an economy’s initial capital is relatively small, no entrepreneur receives funding and
the general technology attracts all investment because its return is relatively high. The equilibrium
is thus the same regardless of the cost of information acquisition as entrepreneurs are not funded.
The resulting capital allocation is eﬃcient.
As the amount of capital grows, the return to the general technology decreases and eventually
falls to AH; H entrepreneurs can thus attract capital by oﬀering return g.As long as the total capital
supply is lower than
g−1(AL)
αL , the marginal return to investment in the general technology remains
relatively high. Since L entrepreneurs cannot oﬀer a return higher than the general technology, they
are not funded. When the economy’s initial capital is larger than
g−1(AL)
αL ,e v e nL entrepreneurs
receive funding.
Favoritism leads to an increasingly ineﬃcient allocation of capital as the initial saving grows.
Capital allocation may be ineﬃcient even if only H entrepreneurs are funded. Without information
acquisition, many ﬁnanciers are unable to identify H entrepreneurs and thus overinvest in the
general technology. In equilibrium, H entrepreneurs’ investment is below the optimal level and the
productivity of the general technology lower than AH. For higher levels of initial capital, not only
is there overinvestment in the general technology, but also lower productivity entrepreneurs receive
funding since the return of the general technology decreases. The average productivity of capital
and ﬁnanciers’ equilibrium returns decrease in the economy’s initial capital.
We can obtain interesting insights on diﬀerent agents’ welfare by comparing the payoﬀsi nt h e
equilibrium with favoritism and eﬃcient markets.
Corollary 1 (Financiers’ welfare) Eﬃcient markets lead to higher ﬁnanciers’ returns than fa-
voritism.
Financiers are clearly better oﬀ when markets are eﬃcient and information is freely available,
as they can obtain at least return AH . If capital allocation is driven by favoritism, ﬁnanciers’
equilibrium return decreases in the initial capital of the economy. This eﬀect is not due to a large
5This may be thought as if the entrepreneur competed al aBertrand with the traditional technology.
11amount of capital chasing limited investment opportunities — under our assumptions, any amount
of capital could be invested with return AH. A lower equilibrium return is due to asymmetric
information leading to market segmentation. In some instances, ﬁnanciers are not aware of any H
entrepreneur. In other cases, H entrepreneurs, being aware that ﬁnanciers do not have investment
opportunities alternative to the general technology, oﬀer low returns to ﬁnanciers.
Contrary to ﬁnanciers, entrepreneurs are better oﬀ with favoritism than with markets.
Corollary 2 (Entrepreneurs’ welfare) Both types of entrepreneurs are (weakly) better oﬀ with fa-
voritism than with eﬃcient markets. In particular, the payoﬀ of H entrepreneurs is strictly larger
when ﬁnanciers are not aware of distant entrepreneurs.
When information is freely available, L entrepreneurs are not funded as any amount of capital
can be invested with return AH. Under favoritism, if kI >
g−1(AL)
αL , L entrepreneurs invest the
same amount of capital of H entrepreneurs. However, the payoﬀ to L entrepreneurs remains zero
as they have to distribute all the output to external ﬁnanciers.
More interestingly, even H entrepreneurs prefer favoritism to markets. Although H entrepre-
neurs are funded in both cases, they are better oﬀ with asymmetric information due to reduced
competition for capital. When information is freely available, H entrepreneurs are funded with
a larger amount of capital. The payoﬀso fH entrepreneurs, however, are zero, as competition
with other H entrepreneurs drives the return oﬀered to ﬁnanciers up to AH .W h e nﬁnanciers do
not acquire information, H entrepreneurs can oﬀer ﬁnanciers the return of their best alternative
investment opportunity. H entrepreneurs’ payoﬀ is thus positive as
¡
AH − max
¡
g,AL¢¢
> 0.T h i s
implies that H entrepreneurs prefer to run smaller ﬁrms but oﬀer lower returns to attract external
capital.
B.2 Imperfect Markets
In this section, we show that if acquiring information involves a cost, markets arise but remain
ineﬃcient. Besides deriving the conditions under which some ﬁnanciers ﬁnd it optimal to acquire
information about a distant entrepreneur, we also characterize to what extent acquiring information
about one distant entrepreneur improves the capital allocation with respect to favoritism.
The cost of information acquisition τ induces a segmentation in the market for capital thus
12potentially decreases competition among entrepreneurs to attract external funds. The extent of
competition depends on ﬁnanciers’ actual decisions to acquire information and the average quality
of the available investment opportunities. A ﬁnancier evaluates a distant entrepreneur only if she
expects a return suﬃciently larger than the return of the general technology that she can cover the
cost of information acquisition. By acquiring information, a ﬁnancier can improve her expected
return to investment because entrepreneurs face more competition for attracting capital from ﬁ-
nanciers with more investment opportunities and thus oﬀer a higher fraction of future expected
cash ﬂows.
Some ﬁnanciers ﬁnd it optimal to acquire information only if the expected return from evaluating
a distant entrepreneur is suﬃciently large to cover the cost of information acquisition. We derive the
equilibrium in the Appendix by comparing a ﬁnancier’s expected payoﬀs from acquiring information
and from not doing so.
In equilibrium, favoritism is overcome and imperfect markets emerge only as capital increases. In
fact, no ﬁnancier acquires information when the initial capital is low and, thus, the expected return
from investing in the general technology is close to AH. In this case, expanding the investment
opportunity set by observing a distant entrepreneur does not improve signiﬁcantly the expected
return, as the general technology already oﬀers high return at no cost. Close entrepreneurs are
able to attract capital only if they can compete with the general technology. The equilibrium is
thus described by Proposition 1. If capital is relatively low, the eﬃcient capital allocation can be
achieved even with segmented markets (favoritism).
As capital grows, more capital is allocated to the general technology. The consequent decrease in
ﬁnanciers’ expected return to capital eventually makes the return from spending τ and investigating
a distant entrepreneur attractive enough that some ﬁnanciers start acquiring information.
The following Proposition derives conditions under which it is optimal to acquire information
and fund only H entrepreneurs.
Proposition 2 (Early arrival of markets) Some ﬁnanciers acquire information and fund only H
entrepreneurs if IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ <kI <
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 + Iτ.
Given the investment opportunities of the economy, return to capital is higher if ﬁnanciers have
an incentive to acquire information for relatively low levels of initial saving, as H entrepreneurs can
13attract funding from distant ﬁnanciers. Hence, less capital is ineﬃciently allocated to the general
technology. Whether it is optimal for some ﬁnanciers to acquire information and fund only H
entrepreneurs depends on certain exogenous characteristics of the economy. In particular, some
ﬁnanciers begin to acquire information for a relatively low level of initial capital and fund only H
entrepreneurs if (1) there are suﬃciently many high productive entrepreneurs, (2) the diﬀerence
in productivity between H and L entrepreneurs is relatively high, and (3) the cost of information
acquisition is low relative to ﬁnanciers’ capital endowment. Under these conditions, markets emerge
for relatively low levels of initial saving.
Proposition 2 states more formally the conditions under which this is the case. From a formal
point of view, these conditions are equivalent to require that the interval
µ
IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ,
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 + Iτ
¶
is well-deﬁned (and thus the condition AL <g
µ³
αL
αH
´2
IτAL
AH−AL
¶
holds). Intuitively, a lower pro-
portion of L entrepreneurs aﬀects incentives to acquire information because ﬁnanciers beneﬁtf r o m
discovering an H entrepreneur only if they are close to an H entrepreneur. Only in this case,
competition for capital allows them to obtain return AH. Otherwise, they are oﬀered only the
return of their next best investment opportunity, to which they have access without incurring the
information acquisition cost. Similarly, ﬁnanciers are more inclined to acquire information if this
can yield them a relatively higher return, which, for given AL, depends positively on AH,o ri ft h e
cost of information acquisition is relatively low. Then, if kI ∈
·
IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ,
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 + Iτ
¸
,
an equilibrium in which some ﬁnanciers acquire information and fund only H entrepreneurs exists.
Under the condition in Proposition 2, markets emerge for relatively low levels of initial saving.
Capital market segmentations are thus partially overcome: Financiers allocate capital to the en-
trepreneur with highest productivity, whether distant or close. Markets remain ineﬃcient however
because with probability
¡
αL¢2 some ﬁnanciers do not identify any H entrepreneur. This leads to
overinvestment in the general technology and drive down its return.
It is interesting to note that if AL 6 g
³
αL
(αH)
2
IτAL
AH−AL + αLIτ
´
, a more restrictive condition than
the one necessary for the above interval to be well-deﬁned, some ﬁnanciers acquire information
even though with no information acquisition they would fund only H entrepreneurs. They do so in
order to improve their outside options and thus obtain return AH if they happen to discover two
H entrepreneurs (with probability
¡
αH¢2). Also in this case, information acquisition improves the
eﬃciency of capital allocation as more H entrepreneurs are identiﬁed. Thus, on average, investment
14in the general technology decreases while H entrepreneurs invest more.
If g
³
αL
(αH)
2
IτAL
AH−AL + αLIτ
´
<A L <g
µ³
αL
αH
´2
IτAL
AH−AL
¶
, instead, ﬁnanciers fund both H and L
entrepreneurs without acquiring information for any level of capital in the interval
·
g−1(AL)
αL , IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ
¸
.
Only when capital reaches the threshold IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL)+Iτ, they acquire information and stop fund-
ing L entrepreneurs. Information acquisition improves capital allocation even to a larger extent in
this case, as L entrepreneurs would receive funding if ﬁnanciers did not acquire information.
Proposition 3 (Early arrival of markets) Some ﬁnanciers acquire information and fund both H
and L entrepreneurs if kI > max
µ
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 + Iτ, IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ
¶
.
Proposition 3 describes the conditions under which funding both H and L entrepreneurs is
optimal. First, consider the scenario described in Proposition 2, in which conditions are favorable
to information acquisition for low levels of initial saving. In this case, Proposition 3 implies that
as capital exceeds the threshold
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 +Iτ, ﬁnanciers continue to acquire information, but fund
both H and L entrepreneurs. This depends on the fact that the initial capital is so high that
when all ﬁnanciers who identify two L entrepreneurs invest in the general technology, the return
of the general technology is below AL. Financiers thus acquire information in equilibrium because
even fostering competition between low quality entrepreneurs can improve their return. That is,
although markets mitigate the local market segmentation, they are clearly ineﬃcient.
If AL 1 g
µ³
αL
αH
´2
IτAL
AH−AL
¶
, conditions are less favorable to information acquisition. Hence, an
equilibrium in which ﬁnanciers acquire information for intermediate levels of capital and fund only
H entrepreneur does not emerge. In this case, the probability of encountering an H entrepreneur
and/or the diﬀerence in productivity between H and L entrepreneur are too low, and the informa-
tion acquisition cost too high, in order to spur information acquisition. When the initial capital of
the economy grows above
g−1(AL)
αL , ﬁnanciers choose not to evaluate any distant entrepreneur and
fund the close entrepreneur whatever its type is. Favoritism thus remains an equilibrium and leads
to an allocation of capital that is less eﬃcient than the one that markets, even though imperfect,
would lead to for the same level of initial capital.
Some ﬁnanciers acquire information and market emerge only if kI 1 IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ (note
that under this second scenario this condition implies a far higher level of capital than other the
ﬁrst scenario), as for this large level of capital the return oﬀered by the general technology becomes
15very low. Thus, spurring competition between low quality entrepreneurs becomes optimal from the
point of view of ﬁnanciers. As capital becomes suﬃciently large markets emerge in this case as
well, but they remain far more ineﬃcient. The only function of markets is creating competition
for capital among entrepreneurs and drive up ﬁnanciers’ equilibrium returns. However, since L
entrepreneurs are funded, the emergence of markets causes a far lower proportional increase in the
level of output than other the ﬁrst scenario.
To summarize, markets do not emerge for low levels of initial saving — markets are a sort
of luxury good that materializes only when economies reach a minimum level of initial capital.
Moreover, markets do not deterministically appear for a given level of initial capital. In some
economies with conditions favorable to information acquisition, markets emerge for intermediate
levels of initial saving and signiﬁcantly improve the allocation of capital because they prevent low
productivity projects from being funded. In this case, markets cause large increases in domestic
output and prosper for relatively high level of capital. Only when the initial saving becomes very
large, if investors continue to investigate at most one distant entrepreneur, low productivity projects
receive funding. In other economies, with conditions less favorable for information acquisition,
segmentations in local markets for capital persist for a signiﬁcantly larger range of initial saving.
Favoritism is an equilibrium outcome even if it leads to a signiﬁcant capital misallocation. When
markets ultimately emerge, they only marginally improve capital allocation and have small positive
eﬀects on domestic output as L entrepreneurs continue to be funded. The most signiﬁcant eﬀect of
markets is to create competition for capital and to drive up the return of ﬁnanciers.
CW e l f a r e E ﬀects
So far we have shown that market segmentation decreases the average productivity of investment
as ﬁnanciers cannot observe all the investment opportunities and thus end up investing in lower
productivity entrepreneurs. Diﬀerent equilibrium conﬁgurations have dramatic eﬀects not only
on capital allocation but also on agents’ payoﬀs. The following proposition compares ﬁnanciers’
returns in imperfect markets with their returns in eﬃcient markets and in the equilibrium with
favoritism.
Proposition 4 Perfect markets lead to (weakly) higher ﬁnanciers’ returns than imperfect markets.
The latter in turn lead to (weakly) higher ﬁnanciers’ returns than favoritism.
16The intuition of Proposition 4 is straightforward. When information is freely available, ﬁnanciers
can identify all available investment opportunities. Competition for funds among high productivity
entrepreneurs drives up the return necessary for attracting funds. In equilibrium, the return to the
ﬁnanciers is AH per capital invested, the highest attainable return in a capital-abundant economy
When there is asymmetric information and initial saving is relatively high, the expected return
of ﬁnanciers is less than AH. Even if spending τ and observing the productivity of a distant en-
trepreneur increases the return to investment in some states of the world, it does not warrant an
expected payoﬀ of AH.I n f a c t , ﬁnanciers’ return does not depend only on the type of entrepre-
neurs that they happen to evaluate, but also on their other investment opportunities. Financiers
thus obtain a return AH only if they have the opportunity of investing in two high productivity
entrepreneurs as competition for funds between the two high-productivity entrepreneurs drives up
the return to investment. In all remaining cases, ﬁnanciers identify entrepreneurs with diﬀerent
productivity. In equilibrium, they are oﬀered only the return of their best alternative investment
opportunity, which is lower than AH, and fund the most productive entrepreneurs.
With favoritism, ﬁnanciers have even more limited investment opportunities. Financiers’ returns
are higher with ineﬃcient markers. Information acquisition expands the set of possible investment
opportunities available to ﬁnanciers, increases competition for funds, and drives up equilibrium
returns. Nevertheless, ﬁnanciers actually ﬁnd it optimal to acquire information only if the increase
in expected return is suﬃcient to compensate the cost τ.
While a reduction in asymmetric information spurs competition for funds and increases the
welfare of external ﬁnanciers, it may increase or decreases the welfare of entrepreneurs.
Proposition 5 H entrepreneurs are better oﬀ with imperfect markets than with perfect markets.
H entrepreneurs can be either better oﬀ or worse oﬀ with imperfect markets in comparison to
favoritism. The payoﬀ of L e n t r e p r e n e u r si sa l w a y sz e r o .
Information asymmetry aﬀects entrepreneurs’ welfare in two ways. First, an improvement in
the quality of information (because ﬁnanciers evaluate distant entrepreneurs or because information
is freely available) allows ﬁnanciers to identify a larger set of investment opportunities and thus
allows capital to ﬂow to more productive entrepreneurs. This clearly beneﬁts higher productivity
entrepreneurs because a decrease in the misallocation of capital allows them to run larger scale
17projects.
Second, more information increases competition for external funds. An improvement in the
quality of information coincides with an expansion of ﬁnanciers’ investment opportunities. Since
entrepreneurs compete to attract external funds, they have to oﬀer a higher return to external
ﬁnanciers in equilibrium. This decreases the rent entrepreneurs can enjoy per unit of capital
invested. Entrepreneurs thus may prefer a higher level of information asymmetry in order to enjoy
a higher rent on a smaller scale project.
The capital allocation and the competition eﬀects inﬂuence entrepreneurs according to their
type: L entrepreneurs’s payoﬀ is not aﬀected by the extent of ﬁnanciers’ information as their rent
is always zero. The expected payoﬀ of H entrepreneurs is zero when information is freely available
because, with probability 1, they have to compete for funding with other H entrepreneurs. This
implies that they enjoy no rents even if they can run larger scale projects.
The rationale behind that H entrepreneurs are better oﬀ in the case of information asymmetry
is the following: When information is costly, even if only H entrepreneurs are funded (the case
in which competition for funding is stronger because ﬁnanciers have better alternative investment
opportunities), with some probability, an H entrepreneur is evaluated with another H entrepreneur
and has to oﬀer return AH to attract capital. With positive probability, however, he is evaluated
with a L entrepreneur. In this case, competition for capital is limited because external ﬁnanciers
lack alternative investment opportunities. By oﬀering a return lower than AH per unit of capital
invested, the H entrepreneur can attract funding and enjoy a positive rent. This implies that
entrepreneurs are better oﬀ when information acquisition is costly compared to when information
is freely available.
Entrepreneurs however do not always beneﬁt from information acquisition. As noted above,
L entrepreneurs’ payoﬀ does not depend on ﬁnanciers’ quality of information. More importantly,
H entrepreneurs are not necessarily better oﬀ with imperfect markets than with favoritism. Since
all ﬁrms are funded with no information acquisition, H entrepreneurs beneﬁtf r o mﬁnanciers’ in-
formation acquisition by receiving more funding, as some capital originally initially allocated to L
entrepreneurs can now be directed to them. However, H entrepreneurs enjoy a higher rent per unit
of capital invested when ﬁnanciers fund only the close entrepreneurs. Depending on the relative
importance of the increased ability to invest in comparison to the lower expected rent per unit
18invested, H entrepreneurs may be either worse or better oﬀ when information is acquired. In some
case, they prefer to run smaller scale projects, in order to keep a larger share of the output for each
unit invested.
Corollary 3 Assume that conditions are favorable to the emergence of markets
µ
IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) <
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2
¶
.
For intermediate levels of capital
µ
g−1(AH) <k I<
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 + Iτ
¶
, an H entrepreneur always
prefers favoritism to imperfect markets if αH > 1
2.
Corollary 4 When ﬁnanciers acquire information and fund both H and L entrepreneurs, H en-
trepreneurs always prefer imperfect markets over favoritism for large enough levels of initial capital µ
kI 1 max
µ
2αL
2αL−1Iτ,
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 + Iτ, IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ
¶¶
.
IV An Application to Listing Standards
So far, we have analyzed ﬁnanciers’ incentives to acquire information about distant investment
opportunities in economies with diﬀerent levels of initial capital and shown how they depend on the
cost of information acquisition and the average quality of entrepreneurs. The most straightforward
interpretation of the model is that the mechanisms of capital allocation diﬀer in economies with
diﬀerent levels of initial capital.
Even when markets emerge, agents’ payoﬀs depend on the institutional environment. Entre-
preneurs may thus choose to list in markets where they expect to obtain a larger payoﬀ.I n t h i s
section we show that a crucial parameter aﬀecting entrepreneurs’ payoﬀsi st h ea v e r a g eq u a l i t yo f
entrepreneurs, which may capture the listing standards of an exchange.
If the average quality of the entrepreneurs is high, competition for capital is relatively strong
even if investors observe only a subset of entrepreneurs. Under this condition,P r o p o s i t i o n2i m p l i e s
that an equilibrium in which only H entrepreneurs are funded is more likely to be achieved. More
importantly, if this equilibrium exists, while ﬁnanciers’ expected return clearly increases in the
average quality of entrepreneurs, in a mature market in which all ﬁnanciers acquire information, H
entrepreneurs’s payoﬀ decreases as not only they can enjoy a lower rent per unit of capital invested
but they are able to invest less.
Proposition 6 When all ﬁnanciers acquire information, H entrepreneurs’ payoﬀ decreases in αH.
19When the level of capital is suﬃciently large, the return to the general technology falls suf-
ﬁciently low so that all ﬁnanciers ﬁnd it optimal to acquire information. In this case, a larger
proportion of L entrepreneurs decreases competition for capital. This increases entrepreneurial
rents and decreases ﬁnanciers’ returns. It may nevertheless aﬀect negatively entrepreneurs payoﬀ.
This happens if only a subset of ﬁnanciers acquires information. In this region, a marginal increase
in αH induces a larger set of ﬁnanciers to produce information. If this set is large enough, an im-
provement in listing standards may increase the supply of capital to the entrepreneurial sector to
the point that the ability to invest a larger amount of capital more than compensate the lower rent
per unit of capital invested.6 However, in a mature market, in which is unlikely that an increase in
αH further stimulate information production and thus brings about a large increase in the supply of
capital, H entrepreneurs are negatively aﬀected by an improve in listing standards and are unlikely
to be attracted by it.
V Empirical Implications
In this section we discuss our theory’s implications and the empirical evidence that appears to be
consistent with these implications.
Implication 1 Allocation of capital based on personal connections is eﬃcient at early stages of
development.
Allocation of capital based on personal connections is widespread at early stages of development.
For instance, Lamoreaux (1996) writes that the banks active in New England in the early nineteenth
century resembled “investment clubs”. Bank directors funneled the bulk of the funds under their
control to themselves, their relatives, or others with personal ties to the board. Nevertheless,
ﬁnanciers bought bank stocks as favoritism guaranteed ﬁnanciers high and steady earnings. Local
banks thus fueled the region economic growth and development. As the century progressed, bank
performance declined and to attract savers banks started to issue deposits and developed new credit
6The increase in the supply of capital brought about by an increase in α
H is captured by the curvuture of the
function g(.). Ceteris paribus, the ﬂatter the function g(.) is, the larger the set of ﬁnanciers that have to start
producing information in the relevant interval of kI. If given the other parameters, g(.) is suﬃciently large, the
amount of capital that each entrepreneur is able to invest may increase in a way that more than compensate the
reduced rent.
20standards for evaluating the creditworthiness of distant borrowers. These new credit standards
fostered an ethic of professionalism that ran counter to the values that originally sustained insider
lending. At the same time, they made more diﬃcult for entrepreneurs in the region to obtain
funding.
Consistently with our model, during the nineteenth century, New England had transformed
from a capital-scarce to a capital-abundant region. We argue that capital accumulation is the main
driving force explaining why the performance of credit allocation based on personal ties sharply
deteriorated during the century and why it may have become optimal for ﬁnanciers (banks in this
context) to acquire information on distant investment opportunities.
Favoritism in capital allocation is not restricted to New England in the early ninetieth century
as there is plenty of evidence that banks in other parts of the United States and in Britain engaged
in similar behavior during this period and that this practice is widespread in emerging markets
(Lamoreaux, 1996).
Favoritism does not aﬀect only bank lending. Business groups consisting of legally independent
ﬁrms that are bound together by formal and informal ties are often thought to be drivers of economic
growth in the early phase of development of a country and to hamper further development later
on (Khanna and Yafeh, 2006). Business groups may be thought as a way to allocate funding to
close entrepreneurs without recurring to information acquisition. As our model shows, this leads
to an eﬃcient allocation of investment in early phases of development when saving is low; but it
decreases investment aggregate productivity below the optimal level as saving increases.
Implication 2 Financial liberalizations are followed by an improvement in transparency.
High productivity entrepreneurs have an incentive to voluntarily increase disclosure (τ in our
model) only if they anticipate that this brings a suﬃciently large increase in investment. This gen-
erates the following empirical implication. Firms should disclose more after ﬁnancial liberalization
because of the possibility of attracting large amounts of capital from foreign ﬁnanciers. We are not
aware of any empirical work testing this implication that is particular to our model. It appears
however that such an implication would be testable.
There exists indirect empirical evidence in support of the implication of the model. When
companies cross-list in a foreign exchange, especially if in the U.S., they voluntarily commit to
21disclose more. Pagano, Roell and Zechner (2002) show that this decision is concomitant to raising
more capital, as our model suggests.
Implication 3 Financiers’ expected return is higher when competition for external funds is strongest.
This implication is consistent with the ﬁndings of Lowry and Schwert (2002) and Benveniste,
Ljungqvist, Wilhelm and Yu (2003) who show that ﬁnanciers have larger initial returns on IPOs
during “hot” markets. In other words, ﬁnanciers are oﬀered new equity issues at better prices when
they have more alternative investment opportunities. This is consistent with the mechanism of our
model that suggests that competition for attracting external funds is an important determinant of
ﬁnanciers’ returns.7
Implication 4 Transparency and investor protection spur information production and improve
capital allocation.
Our model implies that economic agents are more inclined to produce information when infor-
mation is cheaper, more precise and reliable. Hence, we should observe that in countries where
ﬁrms (voluntarily or involuntarily) disclose more, more ﬁrm-speciﬁc information is available. This is
consistent with the ﬁndings of Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) who show that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc return
variation is positively correlated with investor protection (readily available information about en-
trepreneurs in our model) and propose that investor protection promotes information acquisitions.
Durnev, Morck, Yeung and Zarowin (2003) consistently show that ﬁrm-speciﬁc return variation
is associated with future earnings, indicating that more information about future performance is
incorporated in current stock returns. Fox, Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2003) further document
that improvements in mandatory disclosure eﬀectively increase price accurateness. Finally, Durnev,
Morck and Yeung (2004) ﬁnd that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variation in stock returns is positively associ-
ated to a measure of economic eﬃciency of corporate investment, which is again consistent with
the mechanism suggested by our model.
7In this respect we provide an explanation, alternative to prospect theory (Loughran and Ritter, 2002), for why
entrepreneurs are generally content to leave money on the table during hot issues.
22VI Conclusions
This paper explains under which conditions favoritism emerges as an equilibrium mechanism for
the allocation of capital. It shows that markets in which ﬁnanciers acquire information and fund
distant investment opportunities are unnecessary for reaching an eﬃcient capital allocation at
early stages of development when the initial saving is low. As an economy accumulates capital,
acquisition of information on distant investment opportunities becomes crucial for achieving an
eﬃcient allocation of investment. Nevertheless, entrepreneurs may not have an incentive to join
exchanges that require higher disclosure or listing standards because they enjoy higher rents when
ﬁnanciers have information only on a limited sets of investment opportunities.
Our model can explain why favoritism seems to spur growth in developing economies and to
hamper the performance of more developed countries. Additionally, it can explain why exchanges
tend to lose listed companies and fail to attract new listings if they set listing standards too high.
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25AA p p e n d i x
A Proof of Proposition 1
In equilibrium, entrepreneurs oﬀer ﬁnanciers at most the return of general technology due to the
lack of competition for capital. If the general technology oﬀers a return higher than the most
productive entrepreneur
¡
g(kI) >A H¢
, no entrepreneur is funded. All ﬁnanciers invest in the
general technology so their return to capital is g(kI).
If g(kI) 6 AH, H entrepreneurs are able to oﬀer the return of the general technology to the
ﬁnanciers. As long as g
¡
kIαL¢
>A L, L entrepreneurs do not receive funding. This is because
even if all the capital from ﬁnanciers who are not close to an H entrepreneur — kIαL — is invested
in the general technology, the return of the general technology is still higher than the maximum
return that L entrepreneurs can oﬀer. So for g−1 ¡
AH¢
6 kI <
g−1(AL)
αL ,o n l yt y p eH entrepreneurs
receive funding.
When only H entrepreneurs are funded, if g(kI) 6 AH and g
¡
kIαL¢
>A H,o n l ysome ﬁnanciers
fund the H entrepreneurs so that a marginal ﬁnancier is indiﬀerent between funding the close H
entrepreneur or the general technology. There exists ω1 ∈
¡
0,kIα H¢
such that kIαL+ω1 is invested
in the general technology, and the rest of capital — kIαH −ω1 — is allocated to H entrepreneurs. A
ﬁnancier’s equilibrium return is g
¡
kIαL + ω1
¢
.
If AL <g
¡
kIαL¢
6 AH, ω1 =0 ,a n dall the ﬁnanciers who are close to H entrepreneurs allocate
their capitals to H entrepreneurs instead of the general technology. In this case, a ﬁnanciers’
equilibrium return is g(kI
¡
1 − αH¢
)=g
¡
kIαL¢
∈
¡
AL,A H¤
.
When g
¡
kIαL¢
6 AL, even with all the capital from ﬁnanciers who are close to an L entrepre-
neur (kIαL) being invested in the general technology, the return of the general technology is lower
than the return that L entrepreneurs can oﬀer. In equilibrium, ﬁnanciers fund L entrepreneurs
and the return to investment is g (Ω1)=AL,w h e r eΩ1 is the total capital invested in the general
technology, and kI − Ω1 is the rest of the capital allocated to the two types of entrepreneurs.
Note that there cannot be an equilibrium with g(Ω1) <A L for any capital level of Ω1,a s
entrepreneur’s technology has constant scale of return, and any entrepreneur can compete with
other entrepreneurs to attract funding by oﬀering g(Ω1)+  with   → 0. So in equilibrium,
g (Ω1)+  = AL.¥
26B Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 is obtained from the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1 Suppose AL <g
µ³
αL
αH
´2
IτAL
AH−AL
¶
.T h e n
1. If kI < g−1 ¡
AH¢
, ﬁnanciers do not acquire information and invest only in the general tech-
nology;
2. If g−1 ¡
AH¢
6 kI 6 min




g−1
#
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)
AH
$
αL ,
g−1(AL)
αL



, ﬁnanciers do not acquire infor-
mation and fund only the close H entrepreneurs;
3. If IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) +Iτ <kI <
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 +Iτ,s o m eﬁnanciers acquire information, and only H
entrepreneurs are funded;
4. If
g−1(AL)
αL 6 kI < IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ, ﬁnanciers fund both H and L entrepreneurs and do
not acquire information if AL >g
³
αLIτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ
´
.
5. If kI >
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 + Iτ, ﬁnanciers acquire information and fund both H and L entrepreneurs.
Proof. We prove each of the ﬁve regions for total capital kI in Lemma 1 in order.
Region 1. kI < g−1 ¡
AH¢
implies g (kI)k>A Hk —e v e nH entrepreneurs cannot aﬀord to
oﬀer the return of the general technology. Since g (kI)k>A Hk>A H (k − τ),am a r g i n a lﬁnancier
has no incentive to deviate by acquiring information and funding distant entrepreneurs, as her
proﬁt from deviation is capped at AH (k − τ). Financiers also have no incentives to fund close
entrepreneurs, as doing so yields a proﬁta tm o s tAHk.S okI < g−1 ¡
AH¢
ensures that acquiring
information and allocating capital to entrepreneurs is not an optimal strategy. In equilibrium, all
capitals are invested in the general technology.
Region 2. Financiers have no incentive to acquire information and fund distant H entrepre-
neurs if the following conditions are satisﬁed: Given that all ﬁnanciers do not acquire information
and fund only close H entrepreneurs, (a) ﬁnanciers have incentives to fund at least some close H
entrepreneurs, (b) no ﬁnancier has an incentive to acquire information, and (c) no ﬁnancier has an
incentive to fund a close L entrepreneur.
27(a) holds if close H entrepreneurs can oﬀer ﬁnanciers at least the return of the general technology.
That is, AH 1 g (Ω2),w h e r eΩ2 6 kI is the amount of capital invested in the general technology.
This implies
kI 1 g−1 ¡
AH¢
Financiers who acquire costly information have expected payoﬀ
³¡
αH¢2 AH +
³
1 −
¡
αH¢2´
g (Ω2)
´
(k − τ).
This is because a ﬁnancier who acquires information may receive the following signals and returns:
• With probability of
¡
αH¢2, both entrepreneurs are type H. To compete to attract capital,
both entrepreneurs oﬀer return of AH >g .
• With probability of 2αHαL, one entrepreneur is type H and the other is type L.T h e H
entrepreneur oﬀers g>A L; L entrepreneur cannot oﬀer g.
• With probability of
¡
αL¢2, both entrepreneurs are type L, the general technology oﬀers higher
return.
Financiers who do not acquire information invest either in the close entrepreneur or in the
general technology and have expected payoﬀ g (Ω2)k. This is because the close entrepreneur is
aware of her alternative investment opportunities and oﬀers at most the return of the general
technology. As long as AH >g>A L, H entrepreneurs receive capital from ﬁnanciers who do not
acquire information. If the close entrepreneur is L type, ﬁnanciers invest in the general technology.
Then, ﬁnanciers have no incentive to acquire information (condition (b))i f
g(Ω2)k 1
³¡
αH¢2
AH +
³
1 −
¡
αH¢2´
g (Ω2)
´
(k − τ)
which can be rewritten as
g(Ω2) 1
¡
αH¢2 (k − τ)
τ +( αH)
2 (k − τ)
AH
Financiers have no incentive to fund L entrepreneurs (condition (c))i fg (Ω2) >A L.
28Hence, an equilibrium in which ﬁnanciers do not acquire information and fund only close H
entrepreneurs exist if
Ω2 6 min
Ã
g−1
Ã ¡
αH¢2 (k − τ)
τ +( αH)
2 (k − τ)
AH
!
,g−1 ¡
AL¢
!
(1)
Condition (c) implies that ﬁnanciers close to L entrepreneurs invest in the general technology.
Condition (b) implies that ﬁnanciers close to H entrepreneurs are weakly better oﬀ funding entre-
preneurs than investing in the general technology. So the capital invested in the general technology
is Ω2 = αLkI + ω2,w h e r eω2 1 0 is the capital invested in the general technology from some
ﬁnanciers whose are close to H entrepreneurs.
Substituting Ω2 = αLkI + ω2 in (1) and re-arranging, we obtain:
kI 6
min
µ
g−1
µ
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH
¶
,g−1 ¡
AL¢¶
− ω2
αL (2)
The equilibrium condition under which ﬁnanciers do not acquire information and fund only the
close H entrepreneurs then becomes
g−1 ¡
AH¢
6 kI 6
g−1
µ
max
µ
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH,A L
¶¶
αL (3)
as
min
µ
g−1
µ
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH
¶
,g−1 ¡
AL¢¶
− ω2
αL =
g−1
µ
max
µ
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH,A L
¶¶
− ω2
αL
To establish the upper bound of (3) for kI, ﬁrst consider (αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH <A L.T h e n
g−1
#
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)
AH
$
αL >
g−1(AL)
αL .S o(3) becomes
g−1 ¡
AH¢
6 kI 6
g−1 ¡
AL¢
αL
29But (αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH <A L is equivalent to kI < IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ. Putting together, (3)
becomes
g−1 ¡
AH¢
6 kI 6 min
Ã
IτAL
(αH)
2 (AH − AL)
+ Iτ,
g−1 ¡
AL¢
αL
!
(4)
Next, consider the opposite: (αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH >A L.S o(3) becomes
g−1 ¡
AH¢
6 kI 6
g−1
µ
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH
¶
αL
And (αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH >A L is equivalent to kI > IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ. Putting together, (3)
becomes
IτAL
(αH)
2 (AH − AL)
+ Iτ 6 kI 6
g−1
µ
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH
¶
αL (5)
Since (αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH >A L implies
g−1
#
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)
AH
$
αL <
g−1(AL)
αL ,w ec a nr e w r i t e(5) as
IτAL
(αH)
2 (AH − AL)
+ Iτ 6 kI 6
g−1
µ
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH
¶
αL <
g−1 ¡
AL¢
αL (6)
provided the interval is well-deﬁned: IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL)+Iτ <
g−1(AL)
αL —T h a ti s ,AL <g
³
αLIτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + αLIτ
´
.
To summarize, when kI < IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ (which is the same as (αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH <A L), if
IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ >
g−1(AL)
αL , (4)suggests that ﬁnanciers have no incentive to acquire information
and fund only close H entrepreneurs for
g−1 ¡
AH¢
6 kI 6
g−1 ¡
AL¢
αL (7)
and for
g−1(AL)
αL <k I6 IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) +Iτ, Region 4 of Lemma 1 suggests ﬁnanciers do not acquire
information and fund both close H and L entrepreneurs (see the proof of Region 4 towards the end
30of the proof of Lemma 1).
If IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) +Iτ <
g−1(AL)
αL , the equilibrium of no information acquisition and funding only
close H entrepreneurs exists for
g−1 ¡
AH¢
6 kI 6
IτAL
(αH)
2 (AH − AL)
+ Iτ (8)
Then for kI > IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) +Iτ (which is the same as (αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH >A L), ﬁnanciers have
no incentive to acquire information and fund only close H entrepreneurs for
IτAL
(αH)
2 (AH − AL)
+ Iτ 6 kI 6
g−1
µ
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH
¶
αL (9)
Combining (8) and (9):I f IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ <
g−1(AL)
αL , the equilibrium of no information
acquisition and funding only close H entrepreneurs exists for
g−1 ¡
AH¢
6 kI 6
g−1
µ
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH
¶
αL (10)
as long as IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ <
g−1(AL)
αL holds, or AL <g
³
αLIτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + αLIτ
´
.8
Region 3. In the equilibrium of information acquisition and only H entrepreneurs are funded,
some ﬁnanciers may ﬁnd it optimal to acquire information, and other ﬁnanciers may ﬁnd it optimal
not to do so. So the capital invested into the general technology is
Ω3 = αLω3 +
¡
αL¢2 ³
I −
ω3
k
´
(k − τ) (11)
where αLω3 is the capital invested into the general technology by those ﬁnanciers who choose not
to acquire information and ﬁnd out that the close entrepreneur is type L.
For such an equilibrium to exist, the following must be satisﬁed: (a) ﬁnanciers who acquire
information and evaluate one more entrepreneur have no incentive to deviate by not acquiring
information; (b) ﬁnanciers have no incentive to deviate by funding an L entrepreneur; (c) ﬁnanciers
8As will become clear later, the equilibria with information acquisition and no information acquisition coexist in
the interval
IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL)
+ Iτ 6 kI 6
g−1(AL)
αL .
31have an incentive to fund H entrepreneurs.
In equilibrium, the expected dollar payoﬀ from acquiring information and funding only H en-
trepreneurs is
³¡
αH¢2 AH +
³
1 −
¡
αH¢2´
g(Ω3)
´
(k − τ). The expected payoﬀ from not acquiring
information is g(Ω3)k,a se v e nH entrepreneurs, being aware of the alternative investment oppor-
tunities of the ﬁnanciers, oﬀer at most g.
So (a) is met (at least some ﬁnanciers acquire information and fund only H entrepreneurs) if
³¡
αH¢2
AH +
³
1 −
¡
αH¢2´
g (Ω3)
´
(k − τ) 1 g(Ω3)k
Or
g(Ω3) 6
¡
αH¢2 (k − τ)
τ +( αH)
2 (k − τ)
AH (12)
Clearly, if the expected payoﬀ from acquiring information and funding only H entrepreneurs is
strictly larger (i.e., if inequality (12) is strictly satisﬁed), then all ﬁnanciers prefer costly information
acquisition, so ω3 =0 .I fi n e q u a l i t y(12) is weakly satisﬁed, then some but not all ﬁnanciers acquire
information, so ω3 > 0.
(b) holds and no ﬁnancier deviates by funding an L entrepreneur if
g(Ω3) >A L (13)
Finally, since (αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH <A H for any τ>0, (c) is satisﬁed and H entrepreneurs are able
to oﬀer return g as long as (a) holds.
We now characterize the conditions for (12) and (13).
First, consider ω3 > 0,t h e ng(Ω3)= (αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH. (13) can be written as
I (k − τ) >
IτAL
(αH)
2 (AH − AL)
(14)
and (11) becomes
Ω3 = αLω3 +
¡
αL¢2 ³
I −
ω3
k
´
(k − τ)=g−1
Ã ¡
αH¢2 (k − τ)
τ +( αH)
2 (k − τ)
AH
!
(15)
32Since (15) c a nb er e - w r i t t e na s
I (k − τ)=
g−1
µ
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH
¶
−
³
αL −
¡
αL¢2 ¡k−τ
k
¢´
ω3
(αL)
2 <
g−1
µ
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH
¶
(αL)
2 (16)
for any ω3 > 0, combining (14) and (16) we arrive the equilibrium condition for information
acquisition and funding only H entrepreneurs:
IτAL
(αH)
2 (AH − AL)
<I(k − τ) <
g−1
µ
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH
¶
(αL)
2 (17)
Next, consider ω3 =0 .I n t h i s c a s e , g(Ω3) < (αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH,w h e r eΩ3 =
¡
αL¢2 I (k − τ).
Together with (13),w eh a v e
g−1
Ã ¡
αH¢2 (k − τ)
τ +( αH)
2 (k − τ)
AH
!
<
¡
αL¢2
I (k − τ) <g −1 ¡
AL¢
That is, if ω3 =0 ,t h e n(a) and (b) require
g−1
µ
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH
¶
(αL)
2 <I(k − τ) <
g−1 ¡
AL¢
(αL)
2 (18)
The interval speciﬁed in (18) is well-deﬁned for (αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH >A L, which is equivalent to
I (k − τ) > IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL).
Combining (18) and (17), (12) and (13) hold for
IτAL
(αH)
2 (AH − AL)
<I(k − τ) <
g−1 ¡
AL¢
(αL)
2 (19)
This equilibrium exists if the interval
µ
IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL),
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2
¶
is well deﬁned: IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) <
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 ,o rAL <g
µ³
αL
αH
´2
IτAL
AH−AL
¶
. Otherwise, the equilibrium of information acquisition and
funding H entrepreneurs does not exist.
33Region 4. We ﬁrst consider an equilibrium in which ﬁnanciers do not acquire information
and fund either close H or close L entrepreneurs. Financiers have an incentive to fund close L
entrepreneurs if
g
¡
αLkI
¢
6 AL (20)
The expected payoﬀ for ﬁnanciers who acquire information and fund both H or L entrepreneurs
is
(k − τ)
³¡
αH¢2
AH +
³
2αHαL +
¡
αL¢2´
AL
´
In this case, only when an H entrepreneurs is evaluated with another H entrepreneur, a ﬁnancier
is oﬀered with a return of AH.W h e na nH entrepreneurs is evaluated with an L entrepreneur, or
two L entrepreneurs are evaluated together, a ﬁnancier is oﬀered only AL.
So a ﬁnancier has no incentive to acquire information if and only if
³¡
αH¢2
AH +
³
2αHαL +
¡
αL¢2´
AL
´
(k − τ) 6 g(Ω4)k (21)
where Ω4 is the equilibrium amount of capital invested in the general technology.
For L entrepreneurs to be funded, they should be able to oﬀer at least the return of the general
technology.
g(Ω4) 6 AL (22)
Following the same argument as in the proof of Proposition (1), (21) can be written as
g(Ω4)=
³¡
αH¢2
AH +
³
2αHαL +
¡
αL¢2´
AL
´µ
k − τ
k
¶
6 AL
which is equivalent to
IτAL
(αH)
2 (AH − AL)
1 I (k − τ) (23)
34Combining (20) and (23), this equilibrium exists for
g−1 ¡
AL¢
αL 6 kI 6
IτAL
(αH)
2 (AH − AL)
+ Iτ
as long as the interval
·
g−1(AL)
αL , IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ
¸
is well-deﬁned — that is,
g−1(AL)
αL < IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL)+
Iτ,o rAL >g
³
αLIτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ
´
.
Region 5. Consider an equilibrium in which ﬁnanciers have incentive to acquire information
and to fund both H and L entrepreneurs. Financiers have an incentive to acquire information if
³¡
αH¢2
AH +
³
2αHαL +
¡
αL¢2´
AL
´
(k − τ) 1 g(Ω4)k.
This implies:
kI >
IτAL
(αH)
2 (AH − AL)
+ Iτ
Additionally, L entrepreneurs must be able to oﬀer at least the return of the general technology.
Hence AL 1 g(Ω4). ﬁnanciers who observe two L entrepreneurs actually invest in the general
technology or in the entrepreneurs and earn return ALif kI 1
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 + Iτ. Then
kI > max
Ã
IτAL
(αH)
2 (AH − AL)
+ Iτ,
g−1 ¡
AL¢
(αL)
2 + Iτ
!
The condition of the lemma, AL <g
µ³
αL
αH
´2
IτAL
AH−AL
¶
, ensures IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) <
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 .S o
ﬁnanciers acquire information and fund both H and L entrepreneurs if
kI >
g−1 ¡
AL¢
(αL)
2 + Iτ.
Lemma 2 Suppose AL 1 g
µ³
αL
αH
´2
IτAL
AH−AL
¶
.T h e n
1. If kI < g−1 ¡
AH¢
, ﬁnanciers do not acquire information and invest only in the general tech-
nology;
352. If g−1 ¡
AH¢
6 kI <
g−1(AL)
αL , ﬁnanciers do not acquire information and fund only H entre-
preneurs;
3. If kI 1
g−1(AL)
αL , both types of entrepreneurs are funded. In equilibrium, some ﬁnanciers
invest in information acquisition if kI 1 IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ.
Proof. We prove each of the regions in Lemma 2 in order.
Region 1. See the proof of Region 1 in Lemma 1.
Region 2. Similar to the proof of Region 2 in Lemma 1, we establish that ﬁnanciers do not ac-
quire information and fund only close H entrepreneurs if (3) is satisﬁed. Then if (αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH <
AL,t h e n
g−1
#
max
#
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)
AH,AL
$$
αL =
g−1(AL)
αL .A l s o , (αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH <A L is equivalent to
kI < IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ.T h u s ,(3) becomes
g−1 ¡
AH¢
6 kI 6 min
Ã
IτAL
(αH)
2 (AH − AL)
+ Iτ,
g−1 ¡
AL¢
αL
!
Condition AL 1 g
µ³
αL
αH
´2
IτAL
AH−AL
¶
implies that
g−1(AL)
αL < IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ.
If (αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH >A L (which is equivalent to kI > IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL)+Iτ), then
g−1
#
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)
AH
$
αL <
g−1(AL)
αL ,a n d(3) becomes
IτAL
(αH)
2 (AH − AL)
+ Iτ <kI <
g−1
µ
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH
¶
αL
But this implies IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ 6 kI 6
g−1(AL)
αL , which contradicts to the condition AL 1
g
µ³
αL
αH
´2
IτAL
AH−AL
¶
. Hence the equilibrium that ﬁnanciers do not acquire information and fund
only close H entrepreneurs exists for g−1 ¡
AH¢
6 kI 6
g−1(AL)
αL .
Region 3. From the proof of Lemma 1, an equilibrium with information acquisition and
funding of only H entrepreneurs does not exist under condition AL 1 g
µ³
αL
αH
´2
IτAL
AH−AL
¶
.
36Then for kI 1
g−1(AL)
αL , there are two equilibria. In the ﬁrst equilibrium, investors do not
acquire information and invest in the general technology to the point that g(Ω4)=AL,w h e r eΩ4 is
deﬁned as in the proof of Lemma 1. All ﬁnanciers earn return AL and both types of entrepreneurs
are funded. Additionally, it is not optimal to deviate by acquiring information if
³¡
αH¢2
AH +
³
2αHαL +
¡
αL¢2´
AL
´
(k − τ) 6 g(Ω4)k
which implies IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) 1 I (k − τ). Hence, the equilibrium where no information is acquired
and all entrepreneurs are funded exists for
g−1(AL)
αL 6 I (k − τ) 6 IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL). The condition
AL 1 g
µ³
αL
αH
´2
IτAL
AH−AL
¶
ensures the interval is well-deﬁned.
In the second equilibrium, L entrepreneurs are funded in equilibrium if g(Ω5) 6 AL.S o m e
ﬁnanciers ﬁnd it optimal to acquire information and to fund both H and L entrepreneurs if
³¡
αH¢2
AH +
³
2αHαL +
¡
αL¢2´
AL
´
(k − τ) 1 g(Ω5)k
Financiers who do not acquire information earn at most return g(Ω5) by investing in either the
general technology or the close entrepreneur.
Note also from the proof of Lemma 1, ﬁnanciers who acquire information have an incentive to
fund L entrepreneurs if kI 1
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 + Iτ. Similar to the proof of Region 5 of Lemma 1, we can
show
I (k − τ) 1
IτAL
(αH)
2 (AH − AL)
Note that condition AL 1 g
µ³
αL
αH
´2
IτAL
AH−AL
¶
implies
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 6 IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL). Therefore this
equilibrium exists if I (k − τ) 1 IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL). In equilibrium, all ﬁnanciers acquire information
and the return of the traditional technology is g(Ω5)=AL.
C Proof of Corollary 3
In order to compare the payoﬀso fH entrepreneurs under favoritism and imperfect markets for in-
termediate levels of capital, we need to establish the relevant entrepreneurs’ payoﬀs under imperfect
37markets and favoritism. These in turn depend on which types of entrepreneurs receive funding.
Case A If IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ <
g−1(AL)
αL <
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 + Iτ,t h e n
A.1 For IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ <kI <
g−1(AL)
αL , ﬁnanciers do not acquire information and fund
only H entrepreneurs under favoritism, and at least some of them acquire information
and only H entrepreneurs receive funding under imperfect markets;
A.2 For
g−1(AL)
αL <k I<
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 +Iτ, ﬁnanciers do not acquire information and fund both H
and L entrepreneurs under favoritism, and at least some ﬁnanciers acquire information
and only H entrepreneurs receive funding under imperfect markets.
Case B If
g−1(AL)
αL < IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ <
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 + Iτ,t h e nf o r IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) + Iτ < kI <
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 +Iτ, ﬁnanciers do not acquire information and fund H and L under favoritism, and
at least some ﬁnanciers acquire information and only H entrepreneurs receive funding under
imperfect markets.
Notice that H entrepreneurs’ payoﬀs under favoritism and imperfect markets in Case B are
essentially the same as their payoﬀs in A.2 of Case A. So we need to consider only two cases.
First, we compare entrepreneurs’ payoﬀs under imperfect markets with payoﬀs under favoritism
when only H entrepreneurs are funded.
Note that in this case the capital invested in the traditional technology is Ω1 = αLk + ω1.
From the proof of Proposition 2, we know that if ω1 > 0,g (Ω1)=AH implying that entrepre-
neurs’ rent and therefore their payoﬀ is zero. Clearly, when ﬁnanciers acquire information and
fund only H entrepreneurs, Ω3 < Ω1 for any level of kI.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t g(Ω3) 1 AH. Hence,
it cannot be individually rational for a ﬁnancier to acquire information if ω1 > 0 in the equilib-
rium in which ﬁnanciers are assumed not to acquire information. Thus, we only have to consider
ω1 =0 .Hentrepreneurs’ expected payoﬀ under favoritism that is relevant for our comparison is:
¡
AH − g
¡
kIαL¢¢ kI
N .
When some ﬁnanciers acquire information and only H are funded under imperfect markets,
H entrepreneurs expect to receive a positive rent,
¡
AH − g(Ω3)
¢
, with probability 1 for attracting
capital from ﬁnanciers who do not acquire information and with probability αL from ﬁnanciers that
acquire information. They can attract capital ω3
N from ﬁnanciers that do not acquire information
38and
2(k−τ)(I−
ω3
k )
N from ﬁnanciers that acquire information if they observe a L entrepreneur. The 2
at the denominator takes into account that when some ﬁnanciers acquire information the world is
segmented in N
2 markets.
Thus, favoritism is preferred to imperfect markets if
¡
AH − g (Ω3)
¢µ
2(k−τ)(I−
ω3
k )(1−αH)
N + ω3
N
¶
6
¡
AH − g
¡
kIαL¢¢ kI
N , which is equivalent to
µ
AH − g (Ω3)
AH − g (kIαL)
¶Ã
2(k − τ)
¡
I − ω3
k
¢¡
1 − αH¢
+ ω3
kI
!
6 1.
Note that g (Ω3) 1 g
¡
kIαL¢
as Ω3 = αLω3 +
¡
αL¢2 ¡
I − ω3
k
¢
(k − τ) 6 kIαL. Hence the ﬁrst
term is always less than 1. Also, when ω3 =0 , 2(k − τ)
¡
I − ω3
k
¢¡
1 − αH¢
+ ω3 <k Iif αH 1 1
2.
This implies that if kI 1 g−1(AH) favoritism is always preferred to markets if αH 1 1
2.
Hence, the inequality always holds if αH 1 1
2. Under this condition, H entrepreneurs prefer
favoritism to imperfect markets when only H entrepreneurs are funded.
Next, consider the case in which only H are funded under imperfect markets but both H and L
are funded under favoritism. H entrepreneurs’ expected payoﬀ under favoritism is
¡
AH − AL¢ kI
N .
Thus, favoritism is preferred to imperfect markets if:
¡
AH − g (Ω3)
¢µ
2(k−τ)(I−
ω3
k )(1−αH)
N + ω3
N
¶
6
¡
AH − AL¢ kI
N , which is equivalent to
µ
AH − g (Ω3)
AH − AL
¶Ã
2(k − τ)
¡
I − ω3
k
¢¡
1 − αH¢
+ ω3
kI
!
6 1
Like above, H entrepreneurs always prefer favoritism over imperfect markets as each of the
components on the left hand side of the inequality is less than one if αH 1 1
2.
D Proof of Corollary 4
Financiers acquire information and fund both H and L entrepreneurs under two diﬀerent parame-
ters’ conﬁgurations.
In either case, H and L entrepreneurs are funded under both favoritism and imperfect markets.
First, consider IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) >
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 . In this case, ﬁnanciers acquire information and fund
both Hand L entrepreneurs if kI > IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL)+Iτ.A nH entrepreneur’s rent per unit of capital
under favoritism is AH−AL. His rent per capital under imperfect markets is αL ¡
AH − AL¢
because
39the H entrepreneur’s rent is positive only when he is evaluated with an L entrepreneur; when he is
evaluated with another H entrepreneur, competition for capital drives each the rent to zero.
H entrepreneurs can invest kI
N under favoritism and
2(k−τ)I
N under imperfect markets, if they
happen to be evaluated with an L entrepreneur. The expected payoﬀ is then
¡
AH − AL¢ kI
N un-
der favoritism, and is αL ¡
AH − AL¢ 2(k−τ)I
N under imperfect markets. So an H entrepreneur’s
expected payoﬀ under imperfect markets is greater than his payoﬀ under favoritism if and only if
αL ¡
AH − AL¢ 2(k−τ)I
N 1
¡
AH − AL¢ kI
N .T h a ti s ,αL 1 k
2(k−τ).
Note that αL 1 k
2(k−τ) can be re-written as kI 1 2αL
2αL−1Iτ. Together with the constraint of
information acquisition, an H entrepreneur prefers imperfect markets over favoritism if
kI 1 max
Ã
2αL
2αL − 1
Iτ,
IτAL
(αH)
2 (AH − AL)
+ Iτ
!
. (24)
Now, consider IτAL
(αH)
2(AH−AL) 6
g−1(AL)
(αL)
2 .A s a b o v e , H entrepreneurs’ expected payoﬀsa r e
¡
AH − AL¢ kI
N under favoritism and is αL ¡
AH − AL¢ 2(k−τ)I
N under imperfect markets. Thus, as
before, an H entrepreneur prefers imperfect markets over favoritism if and only if kI 1 2αL
2αL−1Iτ.
Together with the condition for information acquisition, this implies:
kI 1 max
Ã
2αL
2αL − 1
Iτ,
g−1 ¡
AL¢
(αL)
2 + Iτ
!
. (25)
Combining inequalities (24) and (25), we obtain Corollary 4.
E Proof of Proposition 6
If all ﬁnanciers acquire information, H entrepreneurs’ expected rent per unit of investment is
αL ¡
AH − g (Ω3)
¢
or αL ¡
AH − AL¢
depending on the level of capital in the economy.
From the proof of Proposition 2 we know that g (Ω3) 6 (αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH. In particular, if ω3 > 0,
g (Ω3)= (αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)AH,w h e r e
∂
#
(αH)
2
(k−τ)
τ+(αH)
2(k−τ)
$
∂αH =
2(αH)(k−τ)τ
(τ+(αH)
2(k−τ))
2 > 0. Hence, the rent per unit
of capital received from ﬁnanciers that acquire information decreases. Also the rent per unit of
40capital received from ﬁnanciers that do not acquire information decreases.
Hence, the rent per unit of capital invested is weakly decreasing in αH.
The capital allocated to an H entrepreneur in the states of the world in which the rent is
expected to be positive is 0,
µ
2(k−τ)(I−
ω3
k )(1−αH)
N + ω3
N
¶
,a n d
2(k−τ)I
N , respectively, depending on
the level of capital in the economy.
If all ﬁnanciers acquire information, then ω3 =0 . The capital an H entrepreneur can employ
with a postive rent is thus
2(k−τ)I(1−αH)
N , which is clearly decreasing in αH. Capital is not aﬀected
by αH otherwise.
In conclusion, when all ﬁnanciers acquire information the capital received by an H entrepreneur
is either decreasing or unaﬀected by αH.
If αH increases and H entrepreneurs receive less capital and a lower rent per unit of capital
invested, their payoﬀ clearly decreases in αH.
41